INDIAN ARMED FORCES CHIEFS ON
OUR RELENTLESS AND FOCUSED PUBLISHING EFFORTS

 
SP Guide Publications puts forth a well compiled articulation of issues, pursuits and accomplishments of the Indian Army, over the years

— General Manoj Pande, Indian Army Chief

 
 
I am confident that SP Guide Publications would continue to inform, inspire and influence.

— Admiral R. Hari Kumar, Indian Navy Chief

My compliments to SP Guide Publications for informative and credible reportage on contemporary aerospace issues over the past six decades.

— Air Chief Marshal V.R. Chaudhari, Indian Air Force Chief
       


A Reality Check

Issue: June-July 2011 By General (Retd) V.P. Malik

India’s Special Forces do not have the same capability as the US forces due to non-availability of high-end technology. But depending upon the distance involved and combat environment up to and on the target, they are capable of carrying out Operation Neptune’s Spear type missions across the border or for OOACs.

Operation Neptune’s spear enabled elimination of Osama bin Laden—the world’s most wanted and hunted terrorist leader—in a Special Forces’ action, will go down in history for strategic as well as operational reasons. It has several lessons on the employment of Special Forces in the emerging security threats related to terrorism, border management, security of offshore assets, and to meet any out of area contingencies (OOACs).

At the strategic level, Operation Neptune’s Spear shows that national security remains the highest priority for the US President, no matter which political party he belongs to. It reflects national determination and perseverance to achieve a national security goal and in this case it was bringing to justice a terrorist leadser who had so brutally assaulted the US 10 years ago on September 11, 2001. And if such a goal demands overlooking ‘sovereignty’ of a friendly or a notso- friendly nation, so be it. As this mission and its cause was so ‘righteous’, no nation except Pakistan has raised any objection on it. The operation has definitely enhanced the US deterrence capability against future misadventure by any terrorist group.

At the operational level, credit should be given to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which on the basis of a Guantanamo interrogation report, was able to build upon it, brick by brick, and get to the target. That the target was being shielded by its own ally would have made that more difficult. In such a mission, human intelligence plays a much greater role than technical intelligence and ensures greater chances of success in the execution of the mission. The CIA has shown exemplary capability and once again proved the importance of human intelligence over technical intelligence.

Like the build-up of intelligence; planning and execution requires capacity building, selection of personnel, extensive training, coordination and rehearsals over target like objectives. The plan must ensure total surprise to be able to deliver high results with minimum resources and signatures. For days, the team has to maintain a ready to launch mode so that minimum time is wasted between political assent and mission execution. Security of the mission is, therefore, critical.

The operation in Abbottabad was conducted by a SEAL Team (the acronym is derived from its capacity to operate at sea, in the air and on land) nominated for the mission two months in advance. The SEALs are US Navy’s principal special operations force; part of the Naval Special Warfare Command and maritime component of the US Special Operations Command. They are trained in a wide variety of missions including counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defence and hostage rescue.

Yet another lesson is about the separation between operational and strategic levels in such operations. While there was always some degree of overlap between these levels, due to ever increasing influence of Information Technology (IT), enhanced mobility, long reaches in targeting and effective command and control, this overlap stands blurred. Continuous intelligence briefing of the US President over nine months and the picture of the President monitoring its execution along with his national security team says it all.

Operation Neptune’s Spear has reinforced the need for Special Forces in the emerging security threats in peace and war. In war, they are employed as force multipliers to complement the task performed by conventional forces entailing high risk and high gain missions requiring minimum visibility.

India maintains Special Forces in all three wings of its armed forces—Army Commandos, Marine Commandos (MARCOS) and Air Force Garuds, apart from the Special Action Groups (SAGs), comprising Army personnel on deputation with National Security Guards. While the SAGs have dedicated resources like aircraft and helicopters, state-of-the-art equipment and training facilities, the Special Forces of the armed forces depend mostly on their service resources. These Special Forces are not country specific but mission specific also. Special Forces of the armed forces can be integrated for any mission. For this purpose, they carry out joint training frequently.

India’s Special Forces do not have the same capability as the US forces due to nonavailability of high-end technology. But depending upon the distance involved and combat environment up to and on the target, they are capable of carrying out Operation Neptune’s Spear type missions across the border or for OOACs. However, there are some problems in their tasking, organisational and equipping priorities.

First and foremost is the inhibition at the decision-making level, usually on the ground(s) of moral and diplomatic propriety, poor understanding of strategic environment, military knowledge and risk appetite. This attitude at the highest level gets reflected in their employment mostly on tactical missions instead of strategic missions. We thus fail to exploit their true potential and remain content with successful counterterror operations hinterland.

Intelligence is the key to Special Forces operations. Employment of Special Forces requires accurate intelligence and continuous surveillance of the target. We need enhanced human and technical intelligence capabilities in our neighbourhood and wherever else required. This takes a long time to build and much less to get eroded. A few years ago, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had built such a capability but was frittered away on political directions. Intelligence also requires automated decision support system and real time dissemination along with a common operational picture.

In the absence of a Chief of Defense Staff and tri-Service apex organisation like the Special Forces Command, despite frequent joint training, our Special Forces are not optimally integrated. Currently, Army Special Forces face an acute shortage of officers and essential equipment as well.

Finally, in view of the raging debate in some parts of the world over ethical, moral and sovereignty issue, it has to be stated that strategy and diplomacy in international relations are based on the art of the possible and advancement of national interests. The Western world believes that morality in this ethical system is the handmaiden of state policy, dictated by the situation in which we are placed. Our own Vedic thinking had been that the Chakravarty Raja is free to have his policies limited by strictures and tampered by ethical considerations and sentiments, but not if his intention is to best serve the national interest. A righteous cause is important, but the method need not be sentimental, or even ethical. Kautilya had said, “When the interests of the country are involved, ethics are a burdensome irrelevance.”