The US Annual Report 2011 to Congress specifies that over the past decade, China’s military has benefited from the robust investment in modern hardware and technology. Many modern systems have reached maturity and others will become operational in the next few years.

In the November-December 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs, an article entitled ‘The Rise of China’ appeared. The article was by Nicholas D. Kristoll, the former New York Times columnist, in which he said that China’s economy would surpass that of the US to become the world’s largest by the middle of the 21st century. He predicted that China’s economic growth would have a certain negative influence on the world’s economy. He said that if there were to be a power vacuum in the Pacific and Far Eastern regions, China would take advantage of it as an opportunity to expand its regional sphere of interest. His observations have turned out to be prophetic. Tday, while there is a global fascination for China, the success of China’s national strategy employed so far and flowing from that its military strategy, needs to be studied and analysed so as to establish the veracity of global concerns regarding China’s conduct and stance in the future. As a first step, strategic and military thinkers need to study the evolution and development of China’s military thought through the ages which would indicate the trend of China’s military strategy and give an insight into the mental conditionings of China’s military leadership and their soldiery. This article briefly deals with the evolution of China’s military thought in the following context:

• The warring states era
• Maoist military thought
• People’s War under modern conditions
• Active defence
• Local wars under high-tech conditions
• Local wars under conditions of “informatisation”

The Warring States Era

Chinese have their own unique perceptions, which may be difficult to appreciate without an examination of their ancient military thought and ancient statecraft. Recent Chinese writings about the future security environment have referred to “the warring state era” in Chinese history which pertains to the period 475-221 BC. During this age, the classics of Chinese statecraft was produced and it was also the time when multi-state competition to become powerful, featured schemes and plots, small wars, inter-state conferences, treaties and anarchy. China’s military authors have called the future multipolar world quite similar to the “warring states” era and have declared that the future security environment resembles the warring states era in many ways. The Director of Research at the General Staff Department of the PLA has published six volumes of the studies on ancient statecraft in 1996 that contained specific advice of how to comprehend the current and future security environment. In this context, China’s concept of “Comprehensive National Power” and the influence of Sun Tzu’s Art of War are also important driving factors.

Comprehensive National Power (CNP): This is considered an essential aspect of assessing the security environment. It is said to determine the rank order of power held by the various warring states. The current Chinese concept of CNP was invented in the 1980s but stems from Chinese traditional military philosophy. By CNP, it generally means the sum total of the powers or strengths of a country in economy, military affairs, science and technology, education and resources and its influence (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 2000). In a more abstract manner, it refers to the combination of all the powers possessed by a country for the survival and development of a sovereign state, including material and ideational ethos and international influence as well (Huang Shuofeng,1999). Sun Tzu identified ‘five things’ and ‘seven stratagems’ that govern the outcome of war. Similarly, Wu Zi wrote about six conditions in which if the other sides’ strength was greater, war should be avoided. Ancient Chinese strategists also attempted to help their country achieve dominance through war avoidance strategies. The Chinese are of the view that calculating CNP can aid a nation for war as well as for coordinating a political and diplomatic offensive during a crisis in peacetime.

Sun Tzu’s Art of War was written 2,000 years ago. It throws light on general principles of how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may fight in the future. Another source frequently referred by Chinese military thinkers is the 36 military strategies or stratagems, the last of which is “running away as the best choice. Evade the enemy to preserve the troops. The Army retreats: No blame. It does not violate the normal practice of war.” Other stratagems include deception, ingenuity and stealth—the characteristics which are found in the Art of War and later in the works of Mao Zedong. These ancient and modern texts constitute the military heritage that is imprinted on the soldiery before they enter service and then throughout their professional military education experience. The Art of War begins by proclaiming that “war is a matter of vital importance to the state… It is mandatory that it be studied thoroughly.” PLA demonstrates this idea by the degree of planning it undertakes prior to any military operation, or an exercise. Sun Tzu’s main contribution can be attributed in the field of military strategy where he argued that “the best policy is to take a state intact” and “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”. While overt military strength is important, other aspects of national power are essential to waging war.

Maoist Military Thought

Mao wrote on every aspect of the military; the philosophy of war, strategy, tactics, organisation, logistics, the importance of man in warfare, the relationship between the army and the society, between the party and the army, and so forth. Yet Mao was never attracted to the military profession. His introduction to warfare and armed struggle came when he concluded that it was the only way to respond to the repression of the Chinese peasantry. Later, his Red Army was also engaged in several battles with the Japanese Army. He gained his knowledge and experience of war and in his armed struggle against vastly superior enemies both in terms of numbers as well as the quality of weaponry. Thus he accumulated enormous experience to expound a theory which fused politics and warfare. Most of Mao’s writings, the published ones belong to the era between the Zunyi Conference of 1935, when his military ‘line’ became the party’s ‘line’ and the end of civil war in 1949. During that period, he developed several concepts of war as a social product; war as a form of politics with bloodshed; the necessity for the weak to engage in a protracted war with a powerful enemy; the establishment of ‘red’ bases where the entire population could be mobilised for a total war; the concentration of a superior force to attack the enemy’s weaknesses; treating the enemy as a supplier of weapons; treating the soldiers humanely and giving them political education; party control of the armed forces which were geographically scattered; the three strategic phases of protracted war: strategic defensive to conserve one’s strength, strategic consolidation to build up strength and finally the strategic offensive to annihilate the enemy and emerge victorious. He prescribed the style of war for each phase, that is, guerrilla wars for the phase of strategic defensive, conventional war of movement or mobile warfare during the consolidation phase and then stand-up warfare by divisional strength and above during the strategic offensive phase. During all these phases, Mao emphasised the importance of man over machine (weapons) which he was later to call the ‘spiritual atom bomb’.

The belief in the ultimate victory of the people despite an adverse balance of forces meant that for China all wars would become protracted wars in which the people’s power would ultimately prevail. Another implication of the belief in the ultimate victory of the people was regarding the concept of defeat. Total destruction did not mean defeat and Chairman Mao believed that so long as the Marxist-Leninist ideology survived in the human mind, military forces could be built up from the scratch to continue the struggle. Mao’s political goals and strategic doctrine was therefore derived from the Marxism-Leninism—Mao Zedong thought and these in turn determined China’s military capability.