On the 40th anniversary of India’s victory in the Indo-Pak War 1971, Lt General (Retd) J.F.R. Jacob, the author, who was then the Chief of Staff in the Indian Army’s Eastern Command, narrates how thorough planning, coordination and bold execution led to the surrender of the Pak Army.

On December 16, the 40th anniversary of the unconditional public surrender of  Lt General A.A.K. Niazi and 93,000 military men of the Pakistan Eastern Command, let us pay tribute to all those in Bangladesh and India who gave up their lives in the struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh. A special tribute must be paid to the people of Bangladesh who rose against the Pakistani oppressors and resisted them most gallantly. Let us also not forget the tremendous contributions of the freedom fighters of Bangladesh and the East Bengal battalions who fought along with the Indian armed forces.

On the midnight of March 26, 1971, Lt General Yahya Khan ordered the Pakistan  Army to crack down on Dhaka University and other areas. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the hero of the freedom struggle and leader of the struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh, was arrested. The brave people of Bangladesh led by Rehman, later deservedly recognised as the father of the nation, rose up and resisted the Pakistan Army. The East Bengal battalions moved into India and the refugees streamed into India.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to help the freedom struggle and gave a verbal order to the Indian Army to help the freedom fighters in East Pakistan. An official order came from her on April 29, 1971.

Meanwhile in early April, many leaders began arriving at Kolkata, prominent amongst them were Tajuddin, Nazrul Islam, Mansur Ali, Qamaruzzam, Colonel Osmani and Group Captain Khadkar. A government in exile was established in a bungalow at 8 Theatre Road, Kolkata. During my interaction with them, the leaders said that they wanted to have a meeting of the parliamenta-rians at Baidyanath Tala to declare their independence. I suggested that they should issue a declaration as was done by Charles de Gaulle in World War II. Tajuddin asked for a draft declaration. I gave him a short draft, which was expanded by legal experts. The declaration was issued on April 17, at Baidyanath Tala within East Pakis-tan. We arranged the defection of personnel of the Pakistan Deputy High Commission in Kolkata and they integrated the government at 8 Theatre Road.

The Government of India asked us to assist the freedom fighters. After my reconnaissance, we initially set up eight camps in the border areas and each camp had the capacity to train 1,000 recruits.

The Army Headquarters spelt out three tasks:

• To advise and guide the provisional government.
• To organise and equip a guerrilla force of 20.000 to be expanded to 1,00,000.
• To plan and conduct guerrilla operations in East Pakistan.

We divided the area of operations for the freedom fighters into different sectors.  Major Ziaur Rehman was to be responsible for the Chittagong sector. Major Khalid Musharraf for Comilla, Major Saifullah for Mymensingh, Wing Commander  Khademul Bashar for Rangpur, Lt  Colonel Quazi Nooruzaman for Rajshahi, Major Abu Osman Chowdhury for Kushtia, and Major M.A. Jalil for Khulna. “Tiger” Siddiqui was to operate from Tangail as did Sqaudron Leader Nurul Kadar.

Group Captain Khadkar played a pivotal role in overseeing the operations of the freedom fighters, as General Muhammad Ataul Ghani Osmani was most of the time out at Sylhet with his East Bengal battalions. He formulated the tasks and guided the operations of the freedom fighters. His contribution to the successful operations of the freedom fighters was a crucial factor in the freedom struggle.

The freedom fighters played a decisive role in the freedom struggle. They attacked the Pakistan Army and their infrastructure, created an environment of fear among the Pakistan Army by lowering their morale. Due credit must be given to them for their decisive contribution in the liberation of Bangladesh.

In early April, Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw called me up to say that the government wants Eastern Command to move in immediately into East Pakistan. I explained that we had mountain divisions with no bridges or motor transport. We needed time for training. The monsoon was about to break. He asked by when we should move in. I said not before November 15, by when the terrain should be reasonably firm. He asked for a brief, which I sent by hand with Brigadier Adi Sethna.

A meeting was held in the operations room in Delhi which was attended by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Minister of Defence, External Affairs, Finance, Home, the Defence Secretary and the Director Military Operations. Manekshaw read out my brief and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accepted that we could move in after November 15.

Our Strategy

We assessed that General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi of Pakistan Army, would defend the towns and territory. We therefore adopted the following strategy:

• Dhaka, the centre of gravity of East Pakistan, was to be the final objective.
• Fortified towns to be bypassed.
• Thrust lines were to be along subsidiary tracks.
• Subsidiary objectives were to be communication, command and control centres.
• The Pak Army was to be drawn to the border areas by operations of the Mukti Bahini.