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Pick Up the Pace

Issue: December 2011-January 2012 By Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

The emerging threats and challenges mandate that India should be prepared to fight hybrid wars in the future which may involve the armed forces in simultaneously fighting limited conventional conflicts on two fronts, out of area operations, counter-insurgency and counter-proxy war operations in the domestic arena, low intensity asymmetric wars, cyber wars, and United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking operations

Global and regional security concerns along with the growing internal security problems define India’s security environment. The conventional threats from traditional adversaries colluding with each other, continuing presence of terrorist and fundamentalist forces in its western and eastern neighbourhood has prompted India to carry out force accretion in order to maintain a high level of defence vigilance and preparedness to face any challenge to its security. The developments across India’s western border is alarming and dangerous as the drift in both Pakistan and Afghanistan shows the lack of state control and break down of economy, law and order, and governance. Both states are staying afloat because of the aid from the international community. Moreover, there is also the ever present possibility of hostile radical fundamentalist elements gaining access to the weapons of mass destruction in Pakistan.

The proxy war conducted by Pakistan and the various radical jehadi outfits promoted by them through the instrumentality of terrorism are continuing unabated. In the east, China’s challenge to India’s security is looming large on the horizon. Its strategy of encircling India through its neighbours and confining it within the subcontinent is apparent and palpable apart from its outlandish claims on Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Internally, India faces a series of low-intensity conflicts characterised by tribal, ethnic and left-wing movements and ideologies, and these conflicts have the capacity of deflecting the Indian Government from their long-term social and economic development plans. India is also affected by drug trafficking and proliferation of small arms. Thus the security challenges facing India are varied and complex. India’s response to these threats and challenges has always been restrained, measured and moderate in keeping with its peaceful outlook and reputation as a responsible and peace- loving country.

Indian Army’s 600-odd modernisation schemes amounting to over Rs. 70,000 crore in the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12) continue to be encumbered with elaborate bureaucratic procurement processes. The refined Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) over the years has done little to accelerate the pace of modernisation. A dispassionate analysis would indicate that the gap between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) apparently is widening in favour of the latter. Moreover, faced with a two-front threat, India needs to accelerate the pace of modernisation of the Indian Army, duly prioritised and executed within laid down timeframes.

Future Trends in Warfare

Analysis of current and past conflicts in the world, the emerging technologies, geostrategic environment and the emerging challenges; indicate various trends in preparation for and conduct of warfare. While the details of evaluation and appraisal differ in their content and quality, some shared conclusions with regard to the future trends emerge quite clearly. Future warfare will be highly uncertain because the boundary between war and peace is blurred and state boundaries too are being made irrelevant by non-state actors. Today, we are confronted with a fluid, non-linear and adaptive battle space. It seems that full-scale conventional wars will be unlikely. The factors of globalisation and “nuclearisation” of the region, devastating effect of modern weaponry, sensitivity to large number of casualties, collateral damage and the crippling effects of war on economy of a nation militate against full-scale all out wars. Moreover, technology which will play a pre-dominant role in designing the conduct of future wars does provide other options of waging different types of wars.

The costs involved and the complexities of war waging may force nations to join allies/coalitions, and weaker states will use “asymmetric warfare” to fight more powerful opponents while the more powerful states will use positive asymmetry through C4ISR capabilities to deliver significant lethal and non-lethal effects with precision, speed and crushing power.

Globalisation and interconnectedness will make wars transparent, thus challenging the political utility of using armed forces. Hence military power is likely to be used selectively in an integrated and synergetic manner and with increasing discrimination in choosing means as well as ends as there will invariably be an international pressure on warring parties.

In large standing armies, two or three generations of warfare will coexist as has been the experience in all previous wars in history. American led world order will continue to be challenged by Islamic terror networks, sheltered by weak authoritarian states e.g. Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and funded by the richer nations of the Islamic world. The strategy of global leadership and engagement by the United States, based on the assumption that such a role is natural, will continue in the foreseeable future.

Care will have to be taken to work within the limits of international law, including its precepts on the minimum use of force and proportionality of response. This rule however does not apply to superpowers like the US.

Combat Status to be Achieved by Indian Army

The Indian Army is organised, equipped and trained for second and third generation industrial age; low and medium level technology and conflicts. In view of the developments in our neighbourhood and particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pak-China collusion, have brought South Asia to the centre stage of conventional and subconventional conflict and instability. Additionally, terrorism, low-intensity conflict motivated by economic disparity, religious fundamentalism, narcotics trade, threat of nuclear weapons falling in wrong hands, etc remain issues of concern in our region. Hence the emerging threats and challenges mandate that India should be prepared to fight hybrid wars in the future which may involve the armed forces in simultaneously fighting limited conventional conflicts on two fronts, out of area operations, counter-insurgency and counter-proxy war operations in the domestic arena, low intensity asymmetric wars, cyber wars, and United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.

The Indian Army’s focus should be on a preparedness profile and status which has Rapid Deployment Forces for defensive and offensive operations, smaller fully integrated Strike Forces (integrated with air power and air assault formations) for the initial stages of offensive operations followed by larger “follow up” formations if the war lasts longer than anticipated. Additionally, it should have forces for low-intensity conflict operations (LICO), power projection and out-of-area contingencies. The Indian Army would also need Special Forces for special operations and a nuanced internal security/counter- insurgency force for LICO through reengineering of its existing forces.

Net-centric warfare (NCW) capable forces and C4ISR capabilities will become a necessity with enhanced situational awareness, capability of identifying, monitoring and destroying targets in near real time with enhanced ranges and lethality to achieve ascendancy over the enemy. The aim would be to employ overwhelming firepower/force at the point of decision. The backbone of such a structure would be a well designed communication architecture at the national level with integrated networks which are integrated with the sensors which would be required to speedily transmit fused and integrated data through command and control echelons enabling greater situational awareness for commanders at all levels.

Modernisation Plans

The modernisation plans of the Indian Army in certain specific areas are as follows:

Arty Firepower
As part of its more than Rs. 20,000 crore artillery modernisation plan, the Army is looking at inducting several types of howitzers through inter-governmental pacts and global tenders. The last major acquisition of towed gun-howitzers was that of 400 pieces of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers with a range of 30 km from Bofors of Sweden in 1987, which got embroiled in political controversy. This gun proved its mettle in the Kargil conflict. After about 25 years of neglect during which the 100mm and 122mm field guns of Russian origin and the indigenously developed and manufactured 75/24 Indian Mountain Gun joined the long list of obsolete equipment, the Army still awaits the procurement of about 1,500 Howitzers of 155mm, 52 calibre. Out of these, 400 are to be procured outright and 1,100 manufactured indigenously with transfer of technology (ToT). The request for proposal (RFP) for these guns was issued in the beginning of the year 2011 and it is expected that the evaluation process would be underway. Additionally, 145 ultra light howitzers were to be procured from the US through the foreign military sales (FMS) route from BAE Systems. The fate of this procurement is also hanging in balance due to legal complications. The Army also needs 120 tracked and 180 wheeled 155mm Howitzers for its Artillery divisions for use in offensive operations, the fate of which is unknown

One hundred and eighty pieces of 130mm M46 Russian medium guns have been successfully “up-gunned” to 155mm calibre with ordnance supplied by Soltam of Israel. The new barrel length of 45-calibre has enhanced the range of the gun to about 40 km with extended range ammunition. However, the project for manufacture of ammunition which was to be done by the IAI of Israel, has been delayed as the firm has been blacklisted.

It is now reliably learnt that when the Bofors 155mm Howitzers were procured in 1987, transfer of technology was done and it has now been revealed that the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) has been sitting on these designs for the past 25 years. On being coaxed by the Army, the OFB have now accepted to produce prototypes of 155mm/ 39 calibre, 45 calibre and 52 calibre guns for trials by the Army.

Counter-bombardment (US term counter-fire) capability is also being upgraded, but at a slow pace. At least about 40 to 50 weapon locating radars (WLRs) are required for effective counter-bombardment, especially in the plains; but only a dozen have been procured so far. In addition to the 12 AN-TPQ 37 Firefinder WLRs acquired from Raytheon, USA, under a 2002 contract worth $200 million, Bharat Electronics Limited is reported to be assembling 28 WLRs. These radars will be based on both indigenous and imported components and are likely to be approved for introduction into service after extensive trials that are ongoing. The radar is expected to match the capabilities of the Firefinder system and will have a detection range of about 40 km.