The decision on the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) is not only about the capability and the implications. It is also about the message that India is, by its raisings, sending to China. The message is one of deterrence and resolve. It is not an aggressive one, but the second prong of India’s strategy

The Cabinet Committee on Security has recently approved the raising of a Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) along with two independent mountain brigades. The MSC is to be located in the eastern theatre with its headquarters at Panagarh and the two independent mountain brigades would be at Ladakh and Garhwal Himalayas.

It will take time to set up the MSC as it involves an expansion by 86,000 troops, reportedly the largest since mechanisation in the 1980s. Even as the organisation busies itself with the personnel, acquisitions, budgeting, logistics and infrastructure details; there is a necessity to also concentrate on the very purpose of the MSC, in the interim. What will it be deployed for and employed to do? How will it deliver on its objectives? What are the implications in terms of the ‘two front’ rubric? The nuclear backdrop cannot be lost sight of either. This article attempts to set the stage for discussions by attempting an outline of the implications of the capability from a public information point of view. It first discusses the reason why an MSC is to come about and then on what operational task it would be required to undertake.

The Necessity

The logic behind the proposal is that there needs to be an offensive component to deterrence. Currently, India’s is a defensive deterrent posture with respect to China. The philosophy subscribed to is deterrence by denial. The idea is to make any ingress so costly that the attacker would have to pay costs out of proportion to the gains made, even while making any such gains a questionable proposition. However, in relation to the nature of the adversary and its strength, it is assessed that such deterrence lends itself to being tested by the adversary. In light of China’s military modernisation, it requires reinforcing.

China has been creating the requisite infrastructure and rapidly increasing its deployment of force capacity. The resources for operations will require placement over the preceding summer seasons and subject to perma-frost, etc over the duration. Besides, the figures that find mention in the media is of the need for half a million troops to be placed in perspective. The operations will be at the very end of a long line of communications, where the terrain will dictate deployment levels.

If ‘teaching a lesson’ is intended, then it would suffice for India to give a ‘bloody nose’ in emulating Vietnam. For this, defensive deterrence is adequate and is being further strengthened by the two divisions under raising. These will not only thicken defences, but also provide sectoral reserves for counter attack and hold lines in depth in case adverse situations develop.

However, given the Chinese depth it has in military resources, both manpower and material, it would be able to pay a formidable price for the gains it seeks. Territorial gains will be tangible, but political ends are the more consequential. Learning from the 1979 lessons, China may be prepared to pay a higher price. This means that even if there are formidable defences, effective defence will be difficult, all things being equal.

With the MSC, India is catering for expansive war aims not impossible to visualise, such as may be the case when a hegemonic war is forced on it. China is after all the only challenger to the offshore balancer, the US. India, due to its own power trajectory, has become a player and may on that account need to be ‘fixed’. The capability for fighting back needs to be on hand from before. The MSC therefore helps decrease the possibility of the ‘more likely’, even while enabling coping with the ‘less likely’, but in the ‘worst case’ scenario.

From the approval of the MSC, it appears that a switchover to deterrence by punishment has been deemed desirable. The raisings of the two divisions currently under way in Nagaland and Assam will ensure that deterrence by denial is not neglected. Supplementing this with deterrence by punishment will only reinforce deterrence. Therefore, the raising of the MSC is as much the creation of a capability, as also an exercise in deterrence in demonstrating resolve. It shifts India’s posture from defensive deterrence to offensive deterrence.