While a trade agreement between India and Afghanistan makes sense, more so if Pakistan too is taken on board; it is the term “strategic alliance”, covering many areas of cooperation between the two countries, which is irritating Pakistan

India’s propensity to shoot at its feet is indeed phenomenal. Be it the giveaway of Tibet, Shimla Agreement or Operation Blue Star, which resulted in the killing of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, or intervention in Sri Lanka through Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) which resulted in the killing of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The more recent case being the handling of yoga guru Ramdev and Anna Hazare agitations; the flip-flop on Lokpal Bill; and foreign direct investment (FDI). The list is endless.

The replay of the ‘Great Game’ in Afghanistan, at which the British had failed, is the latest misadventure by India. Russians too had to beat a hasty retreat and now America and the UN will depart, without leaving any trace of peace or stability. In the case of Russian intervention, it was America and Pakistan which played the spoil sport and now it is Pakistan which is playing the double game to negate American and UN efforts in Afghanistan. In the long run, it is Pakistan and China which will rally against the Indo-Afghan strategic alliance and there is little that India will be able to do in this case.

It is Afghanistan that has been the most difficult country for military campaigns and equally difficult to govern. Both the nature of terrain, climate and the warlike tribes that inhabit the land create an amalgam of harshness and lawlessness. Even Alexander the Great experienced considerable difficulties in traversing through this land on his way to India.

While a trade agreement between India and Afghanistan makes sense, more so if Pakistan too is taken on board; it is the term “strategic alliance”, covering many areas of cooperation between the two countries, which is irritating Pakistan.

This alliance covers a wide areas of trade and infrastructure; creating facilities to exploit minerals and hydrocarbons, education, etc. And more importantly, training and equipping Afghan National Security Forces. It also includes regular political contact and cooperation at the United Nations. This agreement has vastly enlarged the scope and span of cooperation with Afghanistan and has understandably raised alarm signals in Pakistan.

A consortium of Indian companies called AFISCO, which includes JSW Steel, JSW Ispat, Monnet Ispat, etc and public sector companies like the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) have cornered the rights to mine iron ore from Hajigak group of mines (B, C and D blocks). But for transportation of this ore, a railway line is to be built from a port on the Iranian coast (close to Pakistani port of Gwadar being built by the Chinese) and from there across Afghanistan to Hajigak. Once the Talibans come back, the operation of these mines and the railway will be in serious jeopardy.

Issues like India training the Afghan security forces, and the term “strategic alliance”, is what is conjuring up Pakistan’s worst fears more than the other provisions of the agreement. Pak military has always dreamt of exercising control over Kabul, albeit through a substitute. The possibility of this perceived enemy gaining influence in Kabul is an anathema for Pakistan. Speaking to David Bradlay of Atlantic Media Company, General Musharraf reflected the Pak military’s view when he said, “In Afghanistan, there has been a kind of proxy conflict going on between Pakistan and India. India is trying to create an anti-Pak Afghanistan and has the vision to dominate the region and weaken Pakistan.”

President Hamid Karzai’s writ does not run over greater parts of Afghanistan. He has failed to get Taliban to join in a dialogue. The recent killing of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani who was appointed by Karzai as an interlocutor with the Taliban is an indication that the latter is not willing to accommodate Karzai in any future political dispensation. Pakistan’s own designs and its full backing of Haqqani group is a factor that will inevitably play its full course after the American and United Nations (UN) troops leave Afghanistan. Pakistan’s obsession with ‘strategic depth’, flawed as it may be, is the raison d’être of its Afghan policy. It would not like India to fish in, what Pakistan considers its backwaters. Pakistan has had an inalienable relationship with the Taliban and other terrorist organisations. It has travelled too far down the terrorist highway to pull back.

American frustration with Pakistan’s continued support to the Haqqani network finally came out in the open, when Admiral Mike Mullen was forthright in his accusation of Pakistan’s ‘double game’ of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. The US President Barack Obama and former President Bill Clinton too have warned Pakistan against this duality in its stance. At some point, America will distance itself from Pakistan. America cutting down aid will impact Rawalpindi, but will not dissuade it to delink itself from Taliban. On the other hand, it will drive Pakistan more and more into the arms of China.

Establishing the Taliban regime in Kabul gives Pakistan the added advantage. In that it would have neither the influence nor the power to aggressively assert Afghanistan’s historical claims to territories seized from defeated Afghan rulers by the Imperial British power. The British had termed the new boundary line as Durand Line.

While Pakistan is likely to view Indian alliance with Afghanistan as an attempt to squeeze it from both sides, China may apprehend its exploitation of Afghan mineral wealth in jeopardy. China has already taken contract of copper mines in Afghanistan and is currently extracting this valuable mineral, as also exploring the possibility of more contracts. Moreover, China will be loathed at the prospect of the spread of Indian influence in this important region. China’s relentless quest for hydrocarbons and minerals in this region would seek to negate Indian influence in these countries so that its relentless quest for hydrocarbons and minerals go unhindered.

On its part India does not have the capacity and will to carry through this strategic alliance with Afghanistan, especially when Pakistan in cohorts with China, militates against it. For India there is no air or land link with Afghanistan except through Iran. The geography itself is a major roadblock against this alliance with Kabul. It will also bring to naught Manmohan Singh’s persistent efforts of befriending Pakistan. Flip-flop in its policy on the issue of granting most favoured nation (MFN) status to India is the result of uncertainty in the direction Pakistan wants to take; though it realises the tremendous economic advantage Pakistan will have from this trade agreement with India. In any case, India is well acquainted with the duality of Pak politics.

President Karzai has been making friendly overtures to Pakistan and calling it Afghanistan’s “twin brother”, but he knows it well that amendment is not possible and Pakistan has a different game plan in mind. With the dateline of 2014 approaching fast, when the bulk of American and UN troops will leave Afghanistan; and Pakistan’s intentions known, he has tried to latch on to the only country he could find willing to help him. On India’s part, the contours of this alliance and their likely fallout on Pakistan have simply not been fully thought through.

Given the constraints of geography and India’s own limitations to go the whole hog with Kabul, the deal should have been purely trade oriented; conceding Pakistan’s legitimate interests in that country and should have taken the latter on board in this arrangement. Karzai too needs to build better relations with Pakistan and assuage the misgivings and apprehensions. Peace in this region is in the best interests of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. For India to have trans-border trade with Central Asian Republics and revival of something akin to the silk route can only be realised by fully involving Pakistan in this grandiose scheme, the latter too stands to enormously gain from such trade. That is the reality we must come to terms with and not give in to some fanciful scenarios. On the other hand, China is well on its way to building trade corridors with Pakistan and the Middle East and finally a land bridge linking the Pacific coastline with the Atlantic.