The Army needs a seamless digitised communication network capable of picking up information from sensors deployed in the battlespace and passing it on a need-to-know basis to all concerned commanders in the field

At present, the Indian Army is organised, equipped and trained for third generation, industrial age conflicts engaging low- and medium-level technology. The threat from traditional adversaries has been paramount in motivating the prevailing concepts and doctrines of war and organisational structures. This has manifested in the preparation and readiness for limited conventional conflicts apart from the low-intensity conflict operations (LICO) which is being fought within India’s borders and in which the Army has been embroiled since the 1950s. The latter involvement has become far more acute and critical since the onset of the ‘proxy war’ in Jammu and Kashmir, assisted, encouraged and funded by Pakistan since 1989.

The future challenges mainly lie in the domain of LICO, including counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations. However, considering the unstable conditions in most of our neighbouring states and China’s continuing belligerence, India cannot afford to lower its military preparedness because it may well be forced to fight wars whose origin or root cause may be beyond its control. Hence, the Army has to be prepared to fight limited conventional wars of high intensity and acquire a relatively small but powerful out-of-area (OOA) capability—in other words, a tri-service expeditionary capability, in addition to a nuanced capability for LICO.

Excessive obsession with conventional defensive operations has skewed the Army’s organisations, operational doctrines, concepts, equipment pattern and deployment. Even the training of its forces needs a change in orientation. The traditional methods of war fighting have favoured deliberate set piece offensive and defensive military operations against fixed defences and, hence, the operational philosophy favours ‘force-on-force’ attrition oriented operations which are tactically biased and in short wars, especially in the mountains, where the gains are going to be limited unless the Army changes its operational doctrine and the method of waging wars and acquires new capabilities.

Strategic and tactical air mobility, together with the development of network-enabled warfare capability and the ability to launch effects based operations against state and non-state actors will considerably enhance the Indian Army’s capabilities.

A New Battlefield Environment

A new battlefield environment has emerged due to the advent of stand-off, multi-spectral sensors with real time communications that give situational awareness so that targets can be acquired, prioritised and destroyed, by day or by night, in all weather conditions, throughout the battlefield, with stand-off weapon systems firing precision attack munitions. It is being pointed out by many analysts that indirect and stand-off engagements from aircraft, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and long-range artillery can relieve ground elements including armour from the role of destroying enemy combat elements at close quarters.

However, this is a fallacious argument as it stands disproved in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While such technologies are lethal and do provide an overwhelming advantage over the adversary if he does not possess them; they do not preclude the use of infantry and armour on the ground. No gains can be consolidated without occupation of ground and establishment of a peaceful order. In fact, asymmetric and fourth generation wars in the modern era will demand a greater focus on all arms combat but with selective employment of ground troops. The tactics and the manner of employment will differ considerably.

Such wars will also mandate a far greater integration within the army and tri-service integration at the operational and military strategic levels which is currently lacking. Further, while the Indian armed forces do possess a few technologies in the stand-alone mode, they are neither integrated nor networked even though they are progressively moving towards this direction.

Command & Control

The Indian Army wants to create a seamless link from the top to the bottom as an integrated command and control enterprise. Command information and decision support system (CIDSS) will be the hub of this enterprise which will integrate four functions—operations, intelligence, logistics and terrain. At the core of this enterprise are three vital links.

At the apex is the Army Strategic Operational Information Dissemination System, which will connect Army Headquarters to the Command Headquarters and forward to the Corps Headquarters while rearwards it will connect to the national command post, the other services and other national level entities. The latter portion dealing with the national strategic level will be enabled through the command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4I2SR) system as it gets established.

The second vital link will connect the Corps Headquarters forward to the Battalion Headquarters. This will be the tactical command, control, communications and intelligence (TAC C3I) system which will be based on the tactical communication system which in turn will currently rely on satellite communications, radio relay equipment and other modes of communications which will allow for static and mobile operations. The third link, the battle management system (BMS), will be at the battalion (unit) level and below and will be based on combat net radio.

The Army’s TAC C3I system is designed to assist in planning, directing and controlling field forces. Its function is to provide:

• Commanders at all echelons with accurate, timely and credible information.
• Means to process, display and evaluate data for situational awareness as an aid for decision support.
• Capabilities to transmit order and decisions to own forces and weapon systems both during war and peace.