Army Air Defence aims to evolve into a modern net-enabled force capable of providing air defence protection to field forces and strategic assets against the complete spectrum of air threat, in all operations of war and all types of terrain. In an interview with SP’s Land Forces, Lt General Kuldip Singh, Director General, Army Air Defence, laid down the plans at the national level to counter air threat and the role of the Army Air Defence in executing the national air defence plan.

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): The use of air power including UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan has had a major impact on the conduct of war. May we have your comments?

Director General, Army Air Defence (DG): Events in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated yet again the increasing significance of airpower in modern warfare. But it also becomes apparent that airpower by itself cannot achieve lasting victory or success without “boots on the ground”. This is an important lesson from the perspective of Army Air Defence (AAD) which is an integral and important part of the ground forces. A noteworthy aspect of these conflicts has been the reliance on space assets for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) tasks and control of high-flying UCAVs. These developments portend a future in which airpower and aerospace power will become synonymous with each other. Thus future ground-based air defence weapons systems (GBADWS) will have to operate well beyond the traditional threat envelope of the current generation weapons. Lastly, while important lessons can be drawn from both Iraq and Afghanistan wars, as far as conduct of air-land battle is concerned, it needs to be kept in mind that the air war was executed in face of unprecedented asymmetry. It is extremely unlikely that the possibility of an overwhelming air superiority similar to that achieved by the coalition forces will arise in a South Asian context and hence cannot form part of our security calculus.

SP’s: Can you give out the current and the future pattern of air threat globally and how do you relate it to the South Asian region?

DG: While some of the issues related to current and future pattern of air threat have been tackled in response to the previous query, I would like to reiterate the multi-faceted nature of the threat from the third dimension. Today, the threat envelope ranges from extremely complex aerial platforms to missiles/rockets and guided munitions. Thus modern armies like the US Army operate air defence systems ranging from the long-range terminal high altitude area defence down to the short-range counter rocket artillery and mortar systems. Sooner or later the Indian Army too will have to graduate to similar capabilities.

Another proliferation trend which is gaining prominence is the shift from manned to unmanned aerial systems. It is a well known fact that unmanned systems like UAVs and missiles provide low-cost, high pay-off alternatives to manned fixed/rotary wing platforms. These platforms are capable of carrying out multifarious tasks like intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), delivery of munitions, electronic warfare, etc. Not surprisingly, trends in development of aerial vehicles suggest the eventual preponderance of unmanned systems for several tasks currently being performed by manned systems. This is not to suggest that manned systems will be phased out, but will become much more specialised and potent. This proliferation of unmanned systems poses a major challenge to GBADWS in view of their high altitude profile and very low radar cross section (RCS).

In a subcontinental scenario, trends in the region point to a major focus on ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and UCAVs. Our neighbours have already made rapid progress and are fast becoming major players in the fields of missiles and unmanned aerial platforms.

The emergence of innovative asymmetric air threat from non-state actors is another issue which is gaining prominence. Today each flying object, whether civil or military, is a potential threat when it is in the wrong hands. It is thus imperative that we keep ourselves abreast of emerging threats, both conventional and sub-conventional.

As far as the tactical battle area is concerned, global trends point towards proliferation of long-range, precision-guided, fire- and-forget missiles delivered by manned or unmanned platforms. The threat envelope is increasing exponentially both in range and altitude, making it imperative that the range and altitude coverage of GBADWS is increased commensurately. Air defence in the emerging battlespace necessitates deployment of multi-layered and multi-tiered mix of weapon systems.

These developments throw up interesting challenges from air defence point of view. In addition to our traditional focus on tackling airborne delivery platforms like aircraft, helicopters, UCAVs, etc, we will eventually have to develop capabilities to tackle the weapon payloads of these platforms. Thus, systems to destroy/disable warheads and defeat soft-kill options like blinding/ misguiding sensors will sooner or later become a part of the arsenal of AAD.

SP’s: What are the plans at the national level to counter air threat and what role does the AAD play in executing the national air defence (AD) plan?

DG: In order to meet the complex and intricate challenges posed by modern air threat, the need of the day is an integrated AD system, comprising sensors and shooters in which various control centres can exercise effective battle management over AD weapon systems through real-time and fail-safe linkages. Centralised planning and decentralised execution will be the hallmark of this system with each service playing its designated role.

AAD is a crucial component of this integrated system and will be a major player at the national, theatre and operational levels. AAD protects a large variety of critical assets spread over the length and breadth of the country with a plethora of weapon systems ranging from guns to sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. One of the major focus areas of AAD, however, remains the tactical battle area on commencement of hostilities. AAD units will continue to operate in varied terrain ranging from heights of Siachen Glacier to the vast open stretches of the Thar desert.

The activities of AAD are not restricted to deployment of GBADWS only. We also have a large inventory of surveillance sensors in the tactical battle area to detect hostile aerial intrusions. The Army surveillance and battle management systems are closely integrated with the Air Force so that hostile aircraft are detected and engaged with appropriate weapons well before they can carry out their mission. Overall, within the gamut of the Indian Army’s vision of the future, Army Air Defence aims to evolve into a modern net-enabled force capable of providing air defence protection to field forces and strategic assets against the complete spectrum of air threat, in all operations of war and all types of terrain.

SP’s: Does it include AD for homeland security?

DG: AD for homeland security has assumed a significant role increasing prominence in the aftermath after the 9/11 events. In the subcontinent too, we have the example of the LTTE using light aircraft for terrorist attacks. Thus the possibility of innovative application of aerial resources by terrorist groups and non-state actors cannot be ruled out. Like other services, AAD too plays an important and critical role in ensuring AD for homeland security. This includes deployment of sensors and suitable weapon systems to neutralise such threats.

SP’s: Are the responsibilities between the Indian Army, Indian Air Force, Indian Navy and civil agencies clearly defined?

DG: Delineation of responsibilities between the three services is adequately defined besides most of the coordination issues to promote a high degree of interoperability. As a matter of fact, a number of inter-services study groups constituted in the recent past have been successful in resolving most issues between the services.

SP’s: A majority of the weapon systems in the inventory are either obsolete or obsolescent. The L/70 gun, which is the mainstay of AAD and is still carrying on after more than four decades, is an example. Are there plans to replace it with a more modern system?

DG: As part of the modernisation process, steps are being initiated for replacement of the existing gun systems in addition to upgradation of a part of the gun inventory.

SP’s: Do you consider the gun systems relevant in the current and future air threat scenario?

DG: Although concerns about the relevance of gun systems in the future AD environment are genuine, I am of the opinion that gun systems will remain relevant for effective terminal air defence against the RAM threat and leakers. While modern AD missiles can take care of the delivery platforms like aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, etc, high rate of fire gun systems are best suited for addressing threat from very low RCS targets such as rockets and shells. This is achieved by creation of a ‘cloud’ of shrapnel in the direction of the threat to neutralise warhead/shell. It is due to this reason that guns form the bedrock of many modern terminal air defence systems like Vulcan Phalanx, Iron dome, etc. These gun systems will continue to be an important part of arsenal of AAD till such time directed energy weapon technologies mature to a stage where they can perform the same in a cost-effective manner.

SP’s: What are the plans for the successor of quick reaction and medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM)?

DG: Plans for acquisition of both quick reaction and medium-range SAMs are in progress.