The Indian Army’s current challenge is to find the appropriate balance between the old methods of conducting war and the new ways. There is no option but to restructure our organisations, our force levels, introduce new technologies and doctrines, and more importantly change our mindset in order to address the changing nature of threats and challenges which confront India in the future.

Recent media reports have indicated that the Indian Army is seriously short of weapons and ordnance. The reports also have highlights that delays in decisions on key military matters and procurements have blunted the operational edge of the armed forces. This has been highlighted in a letter written by the Army Chief General V.K. Singh to the Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh. Unfortunately, this letter was leaked to the media and thus the focus got shifted from the alarming deficiencies in various types of munitions, and lack of certain capabilities and obsolescence of weapons to the aspect of leakage of classified communications and the need to investigate this serious issue.

Operational Voids

The Army Chief’s letter ostensibly highlights delay in setting up the national counter-insurgency school, shortfall of quality ammunition and ordnance, lack of potent cyber warfare units, failure to modernise T-72 battle tanks, delay in upgradation of Arjun main battle tanks, lack of modernisation in artillery and air defence capabilities and delay in procurement of infantry weapons and reconnaissance and surveillance helicopters.

The latest media reports indicate that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence has criticised the government for allowing the situation to reach such ‘criticality’. It has admitted the serious shortage of ammunition and has also pointed out the gaps in existing force levels as well as the tardy procurement process. The committee has recommended an institutional dialogue and meetings between its members and all the three service chiefs for a comprehensive review of India’s defence preparedness.

Threats and Challenges

The armed forces of any nation in the world must have stocks of ammunition and weapons to fight a war of certain duration based on the type of threats and challenges assessed by its armed forces and the intelligence agencies. It is in this backdrop that the deficiencies or lack of capabilities have to be measured. From the media reports it seems that the government has asked the armed forces to be prepared to fight on two fronts simultaneously. While this may not involve all out State to State wars due to “nuclearisation” of the region, even limited conventional conflicts will demand an overall capability of being able to sustain a war of high/medium intensity for a few weeks in two different theatres of war (Northern and Western) which are widely separated requiring independent capabilities. This necessitates laying down of a policy for the armed forces to hold reserves for war (called war wastage reserves or WWR). These reserves are vital so that even at short notice the armed forces are not found operationally unprepared for war. This is critical for a service like the Indian Army whose sheer size precludes making up deficiencies in a hurry. Therefore, the alarm sounded by the Chief of Army Staff is not only justified but also pivotal for the defence of the country.

11th and 12th Five Year Plans

Indian Army’s 600 odd modernisation schemes amounting to over Rs. 70,000 crore in the Eleventh Plan (2007 to 2012) continue to be encumbered with elaborate bureaucratic procurement processes. The refined Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) over the years has done little to accelerate the pace of modernisation. A dispassionate analysis would indicate that the gap between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) apparently is widening in favour of the latter. Moreover, faced with a two front threat, India needs to accelerate the pace of modernisation of the Army, duly prioritised and executed within laid down time frames.

The government it seems has also sanctioned the Twelfth Five Year Defence Plan as a result of the severe criticism over delays in the past. However, for the Army, it would be a cosmetic paper exercise as even the Eleventh Plan procurements have not materialised.

Combat Status to be Achieved by Indian Army

The Indian Army is organised, equipped and trained for second and third generation industrial age; low- and medium-level technology conflicts. In view of the developments in our neighbourhood, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pak-China collusion, South Asia has become the centre stage of conventional and sub-conventional conflict and instability. Additionally, terrorism and home grown insurgencies, motivated by economic disparity, religious fundamentalism, narcotics trade, threat of nuclear weapons falling in wrong hands, etc remain issues of concern in our region. Hence the emerging threats and challenges mandate that India should be prepared to fight hybrid wars in the future which may involve the armed forces in simultaneously fighting limited conventional conflicts on two fronts, out of area operations, counter-insurgency and counter proxy war operations in the domestic arena, low intensity asymmetric wars, cyber wars, and United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.

The Indian Army’s focus should be on a preparedness profile and status which has rapid deployment forces for defensive and offensive operations, smaller fully integrated Strike Forces (integrated with air power and air assault formations) for the initial stages of offensive operations followed by larger “follow up” formations, if the war lasts longer than anticipated. Additionally, it should have forces for low intensity conflict operations (LICO), power projection and out of area contingencies, and Special Forces for special operations.

Net-centric warfare (NCW) capable forces and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities will become a necessity to enhance our situational awareness; capability of identifying, monitoring and destroying targets in near real time with longer ranges and lethality to achieve ascendancy over the enemy. The aim would be to employ overwhelming fire power/force at the point of decision. The backbone of such a structure would be well-defined communication architecture at the national level with integrated networks which are integrated with the sensors which would be required to speedily transmit fused and integrated data through command and control networks, enabling greater situational awareness for commanders at all levels.