The Army Aviation is the arm of the future, a force-multiplier which can tilt the balance in any future conflict

The case for the raising of Army Aviation Corps (AAC) dates back to 1963 when General J.N. Chaudhary, the then Chief of the Air Staff stressed the requirement while discussing the issue with the Select Body on Aviation headed by J.R.D. Tata. General Chaudhary pointed out that helicopters, with their rapid development in design and ability to carry sophisticated weapons had become a potent factor in the land battle. He further opined that efforts at increasing the firepower and mobility of the Army would not be complete without an aviation element comprising of light, medium and heavy helicopters organic to it. The Expert Committee on Aviation also recommended immediate creation of an Army Aviation Corps for the Army. Because of the political and bureaucratic apathy towards defence matters, it took 23 years of persistent efforts to finally break from the Air Force and become an independent Corps of the Army in 1986. The organisation of AAC sanctioned was nowhere near as envisaged in 1963 and continues to remain so even today, lacking the wherewithal to be a full-fledged AAC.

Force Structure

Despite the AAC becoming a full-fledged arm of the Army in 1986, its growth has been haphazard and the Corps continues to be plagued by many infirmities. Foremost amongst these is the opposition of the Air Force, whenever the question of expansion of the role of Army Aviation comes up for discussion. Essentially, the opposition relates to turf with the Air Force holding on to those assets that logically must come under the ambit of the Army.

Today, the AAC has the largest number of helicopters amongst the three services, majority being of the reconnaissance and observation class (Chetak and Cheetah). Despite this, it has very few helicopters to carry out a number of extremely specialised roles in the tactical battle area. While the induction of the light utility helicopter (ALH) has commenced, the medium and heavy lift helicopters, which form the core of the tactical lift capability, continue to be with the Air Force. Hence, the dependence of the Army on the Air Force for tactical movements continues to be near total. A similar situation exists with regard to attack helicopter units, which despite being an integral part of the land battle, remain with the Air Force. Their optimum employment in such a scenario is not possible in the present set up. The Army’s requirement of small fixed-wing aircraft in limited numbers for important roles like command and control, aerial communication hubs, logistics including casualty evacuation and communication flights, is not acceptable to the Air Force. And all this, despite the fact that the Indian Navy, the Coast Guard and even central police forces like the Border Security Force have fixed-wing aircraft in their inventory.

A survey of military aviation organisations, within and outside the country reveals the inadequacies of our Army Aviation. At present Army Aviation assets are inadequate for the size of the Indian Army and the tasks it is required to perform. The expansion of the AAC is therefore imperative. The Army Aviation should possess a mix of light fixedwing aircraft and all categories of helicopters including attack helicopters/gunships for various roles like reconnaissance, surveillance, combat fire support, airborne command posts, combat service support, special operations and logistics.

Army Aviation needs to develop organisations that enhance aviation capabilities to support the concepts of operations of field commanders. The force structure should be tailored to meet evolving operational requirements. In addition, aviation organisations should include appropriate maintenance and logistical support elements required to sustain the force.

Army Aviation Employment Philosophy

In the future, short notice, short duration and the high intensity non-linear battlefield, with deeper and wider combat zones and emphasis on depth battle, the Army Aviation on account of its ability to quickly engage, disengage and regroup in the battle zone will greatly assist the field force as a force-multiplier. The primary mission of Army Aviation is to fight the land battle and support ground operations. Its battlefield leverage is achieved through a combination of reconnaissance, mobility and firepower that is unprecedented in land warfare. Army Aviation as the manoeuvre force in the third dimension is the centrepiece of the land force operations. Reconnaissance, attack, utility and cargo helicopters complemented by light fixed wing and support services like the air traffic control and logistics are all required to support the Army in its range of military operations.

Army Aviation’s greatest contribution to battlefield success is the ability it gives the commander to apply decisive combat power at critical times virtually anywhere on the battlefield. This may be direct fire from aviation manoeuvre units or the insertion of overwhelming infantry forces or artillery fires delivered into combat by air assault. This versatility is the very essence of Army Aviation.

However, there are two areas of concern which need to be taken care of in order to ensure effective and successful use of Army Aviation assets in the tactical battle area. These are the air defence and air space management. Suppression of the air defence by defensive measures or a combination of offensive and defensive capabilities would be essential to ensure unhindered employment of the third dimension in support of ground forces. Air space management in the tactical battle area is a very crucial aspect and requires detailed planning and coordination to ensure optimum utilisation of all weapon systems operating in the tactical area.

One of the major challenges facing the armed forces is counterinsurgency operations. While the use of helicopters for these operations has been restricted to troop carriage, logistics, surveillance and casualty evacuation, we have been reluctant to use the gunships/attack helicopters because of collateral damage. This could be of concern in build up areas, but in remote mountainous terrain and jungles this option needs to be looked at by the Army and the drills evolved accordingly.