It is disconcerting to note that the three services are progressing on the path of acquiring networked capabilities individually with no coherent framework for joint service enterprise information architecture. What is required is to establish agencies and agents for implementation within each service and for effective tri-service architecture.

In dealing with technical vocabulary, the first step is to get past the definitional aspect. Network-centric warfare (NCW) is a concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers and shooters to achieve shared awareness and synchronised activity. NCW uses information for the benefit of the war fighters in peace and in war. The military calls it situational awareness, which implies awareness regarding terrain (including objectives/targets), enemy, and own forces. This information is passed from the sensors deployed on the ground, at sea, in the air and in the space (satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, aircraft, radars, etc) through broadband digital communication networks to frontline units and the decision-makers in the rear in real/near real timeframe, thus making the battlefield transparent and reducing the response time.

Network-centric operations have also been described as high tempo; precise, agile style of manoeuvre warfare focused on effects based operations (EBO) that derive their power from robust networking of geographically separated entities. EBO themselves are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, foes and neutrals in peace, crises and war. This implies timely, appropriate and skillful use of all or selected element(s) of national power which include political/diplomatic, economic, technological, social, psychological, information/media and military among others. Timely sharing of information and intelligence, results in increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality and increased survivability. In essence, therefore, NCW advocates and enables integration and “jointmanship” in which the three Services, in the Indian context, are lagging behind despite all their diplomatic eloquence from time to time. The final aim is to achieve strategic (political) objectives of war with the least amount of tactical effort which incidentally is also the essence of “operational art”. Hence jointness and integration together with innovative operational art are vital parameters of this type of warfare. At the national and military strategic levels, we are continuing to underplay and ignore these issues. Our so called jointness is neither functional nor formalised.

Challenges Related to Net-centric Environment

The threat to India from traditional adversaries requires preparation and readiness for high intensity conventional conflicts which are likely to be rare. In the near and midterm, the armed forces are more likely to fight non-traditional conflicts involving counter-terrorism on land, at sea or in the air; proxy wars supported and encouraged by adversarial neighbours; and home-grown insurgencies as part of India’s turbulent internal security situation. Additionally, the armed forces may be called upon to stabilise the volatile strategic environment around India through a benign presence and if required through force projection. Force may also have to be projected to secure our offshore assets, island territories, assets and Indian diasporas abroad, and to assist friendly nations when invited. Hence, the nature of wars, in the future, is going to compel us to think big, but only with smaller, more manoeuverable, more precise, more agile forces and above all integrated forces. This will come about because technology will allow large forces to be replaced by ‘precision’ and ‘information’ highlighting the time factor as the critical issue.

A major challenge lies in the realm of our currently well defined command and control structure which would need a review because in a net-centric environment (NCE) the military guideline of ‘one up and two down’ may not remain relevant. Moreover, the dividing line between strategic, operational and tactical levels will meet the same fate because the nature of net-centric operations will allow prosecution of operations in a simultaneous and non-linear manner, throughout the battle space, thus hastening the process of achieving the strategic aims and objectives of war.

Another challenge is that while the three services are modernising their respective networks and suitable gateways are being catered for limited integration at appropriate levels, the communication networks existing currently do not allow the type of inter-operability required. The completion of the defence communications network (DCN) will help in this regard if effective tri-service architecture is well conceived, developed and put into place by a suitably designated team of operational and technical experts of the three services.

Conducting Network-Centric Operations

The four fundamental requirements (capabilities) for conducting network centric operations are networked communications, information sharing, advanced information technologies such as agents and decision support algorithms and networked-enabled platforms [vehicles, tanks, ships, aircraft and other weapon systems]. The Indian armed forces are neither integrated nor do they possess these capabilities, regardless of some “standalone” capabilities existing within each service. Our desire to acquire the capabilities is laudable, but if we wish to move along this path of an Indian RMA, then our promises must be backed by agencies and agents for implementation. The military instrument of network-centric warfare will have to be forged on suitably integrated organisations, new technologies, joint concepts and doctrines, and joint training and joint communication architecture. Hence, the important issues that the Services need to examine in far greater details are:

• Jointly evolved communication architecture
• Joint/Integrated organisations
• Joint concepts and a joint doctrine to fight future conflicts
• Induction of new technologies
• Network enabled platforms [tanks, ships, aircraft, etc]
• Attitudinal change to accommodate the concept of NCW