There is cause for satisfaction as one surveys the course of the battle in 2010. The stage is being set for some crucial choices to be made in the Afghan campaign and these could well hinge around the US response to Pakistan’s continued sanctuary support to the Afghan Taliban.

The year 2010 was crucial for the final outcome in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama finally approved a half-way surge. Instead of the 60,000 troops asked for by the US Army, he provided some 40,000 additional troops in two waves.

There were two major changes in the military leadership. Special Forces Commander Lt General Stanley McChrystal was brought in to replace Lt General McKiernan. McChrystal tried to convince the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces to operate without close air support and hence reduce collateral damage and civilian casualties. This led to serious disquiet amongst the US and NATO troops, who were highly uncomfortable with the idea of operating without the advantage of responsive air power. The initial offensive in Marjah encountered stiff resistance and resulted in heavy US and NATO casualties, which raised political alarm in the US and Europe.

General McChrystal made some very outspoken remarks about the political leadership and this was utilised to remove him from the command. General Petraeus, the hero of the Iraq campaign, was virtually demoted from Theatre Commander to lead the campaign in Afghanistan. He was the author of the ‘clear, hold and build’ strategy. His assumption of command saw the restoration of close air support (largely by attack helicopters) and after several delays, the resumption of the long heralded assault on Kandahar (Operation Dragon Strike). The centre of gravity of the Taliban had been correctly estimated and instead of melting away, they have stood up and fought in the hope that by 2011, the US-ISAF forces would withdraw anyway. This has resulted in fairly heavy attrition, which forced some semblance of peace offers from the Taliban. Convinced that they had won this war, the Pakistanis refused to launch the coordinated attack on North Waziristan (which was supposed to coincide with the Kandahar offensive) on the plea of the floods and the Indian bogey. This toned down the effect of the US offensive in Kandahar. However, the greatest anti-climax came with the US President’s announcement that the date for handing over charge to the Afghan National Army (ANA) had been put off to 2014. The threat of a resumption of Al Qaeda/Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) attack on American/European targets was responsible for this perceived shift in strategy. The attack on the European targets has already commenced, with the latest terrorist strike in Sweden. This prompted the NATO allies to endorse the 2014 withdrawal deadline and even promise to stay engaged (economically, at least) in Afghanistan well beyond that date.

This has come as a considerable shock to the Taliban and Pak Military-ISI complex. Their military thinking is invariably coloured by a high degree of subjectivity. They were fully convinced that come 2011 and the US and its allies would cut costs and run. They were keenly anticipating a Taliban victory. This sudden volte-face could affect the Taliban’s morale. It leads one to speculate whether the US announcement of withdrawal of deadline was a deliberate deception exercise. Even if it was unintended, the end result has been the same. It stirred up the Taliban’s hopes to an unrealistic level and has now dashed them rudely. General Kayani and the Pak Military-ISI Complex were dreaming of a complete victory of their Taliban protégés in Afghanistan. There was a quixotic air of triumphalism in Islamabad. In fact, they were almost dictating the terms of surrender to their American interlocutors. Pakistan’s zero-sum game could prove to be its final undoing. The Pakistani military is highly subjective in its estimates and habitually tends to overreach far beyond its capabilities. The key factor, however, would now hinge upon the US and European stamina to absorb the casualties. Frankly, if they do not want a resumption of terrorist strikes on their homelands, they have very little option left, but to persist with their engagement in Afghanistan. The two major offensives of the year 2010 in Afghanistan are:

The Marjah Offensive

As part of General Petraeus’ clear, hold and build strategy, the US had launched a major offensive in the Helmand province of Afghanistan in February this year. Taking a leaf from the Pakistani military offensives in Swat and South Waziristan, it was a well advertised operation that was announced in the media, weeks before its launch. Little attempt was made to hide the preparations with the hope that news of the coming major offensive would induce the Taliban to melt away and thus conserve the US casualties. Surprisingly, the Taliban stood up and fought. Helmand is the key poppy growing area and hence was critical for the Taliban. The town of Marjah was cleared by a major heliborne assault. However, the Taliban seeped right back and the much hyped government in the box could not consolidate itself in the wake of the military operations. The resistance in Marjah was far higher than anticipated and the NATO and ISAF troops took heavy casualties. As a result, troops could not be lifted for the Kandahar operations as per the original schedule.

Despite the major effort, the turn out for election in Marjah was below 18 per cent (it was generally 40 per cent in other areas). This clearly highlighted the failure to pacify the area and effect administrative penetration of the population. Nevertheless, the major gain of this battle has been to bring the Taliban to battle and hopefully impose significant attrition.