Will demilitarisation of Siachen increase the chances/avenues of conflict between China-Pakistan and India? An arbitrary political decision to demilitarise Siachen will be suicidal.

Media is abuzz with stories about demilitarisation of Siachen with olive branches offered by Pakistan amongst increasing radicalisation; intact terrorist infrastructure; and Lashkar-e-Taiba founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed going berserk. The Chinaman is most elated. Forces at both national and international levels are fully exploiting the ‘paid media’ to morph opinions obfuscating strategic disadvantages. The danger is more as general elections is approaching and quick fix solutions may be considered lucrative for political mileage. Though it is incomprehensible that a nation’s leadership can stoop so low and endanger even national security for garnering votes but then did India not encourage millions of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants (many possibly trained in terrorist camps) through the illegal migrants—determination by Tribunals Act of 1984 for Assam till it was struck down in 2005 by the Supreme Court as “unconstitutional”. Ironically, immigrants had already got a stranglehold in Assam by then. Some Track II stalwarts on Siachen today are singing the ‘peace park’ tune and have even recommend arbitrary withdrawal to let Pakistan occupy the Saltoro Ridge. They obviously have little idea of ground and the region, or have their strategic senses coloured with visions of continuing discussions at successive foreign jaunts. Pragmatism demands that we examine why Pakistan has been eager to resolve the Siachen issue (even before the avalanche buried 140 soldiers at Ghyari) and should we demilitarise from Siachen. What will be the strategic ramifications and to what extent would this effect India’s national interests, though we still haven’t defined a national security strategy?

Non-Strategic ‘Softy’ Culture

Much has been written about India’s ‘nonstrategic’ culture, the genesis of which was gross distrust of the military ever since independence. While a paid honcho wrote about an attempted coup this February, Lt General S.K. Sinha, former Army Vice Chief, recently revealed that while Nehru was being cremated, an Intelligence Bureau (IB) fellow with a loaded pistol shadowed the Army Chief who was attending the funeral, since the move of an artillery brigade for field firing was interpreted as likely military coup. You can guess his tasking—bump off the Chief or take him hostage if the coup happens. Today there are many journalists calling politicians to order for demilitarisation from Siachen, ignoring military advice. It would be prudent for these simpletons to study history and know the mess such approaches had led us into. Some of the examples are:

• Post-partition while Pakistani infiltrators were on the run, our military was reigned in and India went to the UN despite Hari Singh having acceded Kashmir to India that included Northern Areas, Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin. We should have recaptured the entire state to ensure a consolidated Kashmir. Had political unilateralism not stopped us then, China would have been wooing us (instead of Pakistan) for energy corridors to the Indian Ocean.
• Grant of special status to Jammu & Kashmir while Pakistan and China have changed the demography of PoK and Tibet altogether in their national interests.
• Drawing the land cover (LC) on a 1:25.000 scale map with thick sketch pen that left a variance of 100 metres plus at any point and not drawing the LC beyond NJ 9842.
• Nehru’s plans to ‘retrench’ the military post independence smacked of thoughtless idealism overtaking strategic wisdom. Vallabhbhai Patel’s warnings about China were ignored. Comprehensive military briefing on likely Chinese invasion given to Krishna Menon during war-games in 1961 was pooh-poohed.
• Surrendering the UNSC opportunity in favour of China.
• Gifting Coco Island to Myanmar which has become a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) observatory. This should have been our listening post against Chinese activities in the area.
• Returning strategic Haji Pir Pass (that links Uri-Poonch sectors and dominates numerous infiltration routes) to Pakistan post capture in 1965 with enormous effort and sacrifices.
• Despite having 93,000 Pakistani prisoners in 1971, not resolving the Kashmir issue; not obtaining release of ‘all’ Indian prisoners in Pakistan and not straightening the Siliguri corridor.
• Arbitrarily halting nuclear testing in 1974 despite China’s 10-year headstart.
• Releasing hardcore terrorists in the wake of Rubaiya Saeed kidnapping, IC-814 hijack and recent hostages taken by Maoists.
• Continued back seat given to reforms of defence structures and military modernisation with adverse national security implications.

Dr Marc Faber wrote in his book Gloom, Boom and Doom, “India continues to be ambivalent about power, it has failed to develop a strategic agenda commensurate with its growing economic and military capabilities…throughout history, India has failed to master the creation, deployment and use of its military instruments in support of its national objectives”. More recently Amy Kazmin wrote in Financial Times on September 9, 2011, “The instruments of State action have become dysfunctional,” says K. Shankar Bajpai, Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board and former Ambassador to the US. “India’s strategic interests extend between the Suez to Shanghai…but we have neither the manpower nor the strategic thinking to handle these challenges.”

Place of Roses

Siachen means ‘place of roses’ in local lingo. The area was explored extensively centuries ago and vivid details are available in biographies of Captain Young Husband who traversed the glacier many times crossing into China. One foreign expedition even entered Siachen glacier from north and then travelled east via the Teram Shehr glacier to Karakoram (KK) Pass. Delineation of the LC between India-Pakistan was done only up to NJ 9842 mentioning from this point the LC runs “thenceforth north”, which clearly meant it follows the ridgeline north, along the Saltoro Ridge. Pakistan claims that the line runs directly from NJ 9842 laterally to KK Pass. In 1984, an Indian mountaineering expedition to Siachen under Colonel Narinder ‘Bull’ Kumar discovered Pakistanis creeping up Saltoro Ridge from the west. India pre-empted the Pakistani move and occupied the Saltoro massif through a daring heliborne operation. Faux passed, Pakistan rushed to gain control of the range as well. Catch-22 happened at Gyong La, where both Indians and Pakistanis arrived simultaneously. A flag meeting was held and an agreement was reached that both parties would withdraw. Indians did, but the Pakistanis re-enacted their back stabbing legacy and occupied the pass in clear violation of the agreement made hours ago. That is the only significant foothold Pakistan has on the Saltoro Range. With forward movement, Pakistanis would face highly treacherous glaciated patches and our troops would stonewall such a move. The second significant foothold was of Pakistan’s Quaid-e-Azam (renamed Bana Post after India snatched it from Pakistan) post on the highest point (over 22,143 feet) in the Northern portion of the Saltoro Range. Pakistan till date does not acknowledge the loss of Quaid-e-Azam post. Reportedly, one Pakistani Army Captain was court martialled for leaking the truth to the media. Visitors on the Pakistan side are briefed that Quaid-e-Azam post is still held by Pakistan.