Like many militaries around the world, the Indian Armed Forces including the Indian Army too are modernising albeit at a slow pace due to multiple hiccups. We are yet to define a National Security Strategy (NSS), have not undertaken a Comprehensive Defence Review (CDR), and have not established credible deterrence to the China-Pakistan proxy wars waged on India.

The overall transformation including establishment of Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) and Integrated Functional Commands (IFCs) has been left to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) instead of going for a comprehensive Act of Parliament for holistic transformation in time bound fashion like America’s Goldwater-Nichols Act and Germany’s Berlin Decree that ushered the required revolution in military affairs (RMA). Our military transformation is being looked at in bits and pieces not holistically whereas RMA implies a major change in the Nature of Warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies, which combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational concepts that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of operations.

Ironically, our approaches to military transformation will unlikely change given the primacy of the bureaucracy in the Indian setup and the politicians dependent on the advice of bureaucrats. Establishment of the CDS (a four-star General) as Secretary, Directorate of Military Affairs (DMA) in the MoD has been lopsided. It did not merge HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) into the MoD as should have happened, reduced the stature of a four-star General who is otherwise senior to a bureaucrat of secretary rank, and subordinated the CDS functionally to the Defence Secretary.

Future Wars

Wars are a continuous affair and not confined to conventional operations alone, which implies war waged on multiple levels simultaneously. Sub-conventional wars would continue to be waged in conjunction with other forms of hi-tech wars. Modern militaries, particularly the US and China, envisage future warfare being won and lost in a cyberspace, enabled by artificial intelligence (AI) and space platforms. China’s Strategic Support Force looks at space, electronic warfare and cyber capabilities. Offensive cyber attacks (both disruptive and predatory), termed ‘sub-threshold warfare’ in western parlance, have become a regular affair – almost on daily basis.

AI is helping militaries enhance multilayered capabilities in handling a spectrum of undefined war situations or hostile environments. AI enables rapid decision-making capabilities in a dynamic information dense environment as well as in information sparse situations. AI has enabled deployment of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS), AI-enabled drones, AI-powered killer robots, Integrated Speech Solution (leveraging automatic speech recognition (ASR), machine translation and speech-to-text to translate multiple languages), and AI-based landmine detection systems. On another level, AI impacts algorithmically-driven social media connections by radicalising public opinions.

Hypersonic missiles are a reality that can attack satellites and hit targets at land and sea at incredible speeds of five to 27 times the speed of sound that are difficult to defend against and carry conventional or nuclear warheads. China’s Dong Feng 17 missile carries a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) that can manoeuvre through the atmosphere with an almost unpredictable trajectory, making it hard to intercept.

The impressive win by Azerbaijan over Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict using armed drones supplied by Turkey highlighted the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Today, drones are being freely used by states and terrorist organisations. Swarm drones are on the scene, China has a large drone industry and Pakistan is acquiring Chinese and Turkish drones to augment its own drone programme.

Wars no more target the military of the adversary alone but the country at large including the public/society and the critical infrastructure. The defender’s military would experience jammed communications, surveillance degraded and weapon platforms subjected to cyber, electronic and electromagnetic attacks. Quantum communications which are immune to jamming are increasingly required. According to media reports, the following equipment are helping the Pentagon fight more effectively with fewer troops; rail-gun, smart-scope rifle, minesweeping drone, unmanned sub hunter, enhanced combat helmet, wearable batteries and night-vision contact lenses.

Modern militaries, particularly the US and China, envisage future warfare being won and lost in the cyberspace, enabled by artificial intelligence (AI) and space platforms

The results of future wars will likely be decided in the realm of high-speed information-networking, software upgrades that include artificial intelligence, long-range sensing, stealth, precision weapons and, perhaps most of all, sensor-to-shooter decision cycles. To add to this, is China’s biological bombing of the world with the Wuhan Virus. This brings us to the situation where precise and directional biological weapons may be used on the enemy in addition to all that has been mentioned above. This would seriously impact the fighting potential and morale of the defending troops.

Conflict Environment - Indian Context

There is much in the media about the internal disagreements in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and possible weakening of the position of President Xi Jinping. But we may be in for a further round of hostilities from China sooner than expected – probably within 2022. The 20th Congress of the CCP is scheduled in October 2022 and Xi would like to showcase specific gains for ensuring China’s sovereignty (euphuism for illegal territorial claims) in addition to what the PLA has already achieved in Eastern Ladakh from its aggression during 2020. Weakening Chinese economy is of little consequence because China is not looking for all out war – only specific thrusts for strategic gains. Besides, it is not only Xi but the strategy of the CCP which is clearly offensive.

PLA’s build up along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), its feverish upgrading of the border infrastructure including launching a bridge over the Pangong Tso for offensive purposes indicates that China would not like to wait for India to build its military capabilities further. China has already integrated Pakistan into its offensive plans against India. That is why it has been arming Pakistan and is now giving 25 x J-10C fighter jets despite Pakistan’s weak economy.

In the event of conflict with China, the IA could be faced with the following:

• Cyber attacks as prelude to the conflict.
• Jamming of communications.
• Blinding of surveillance systems,
• Extensive use of AI-enabled drones and AI-powered killer robots.
• Long range systems to target enemy support systems, communication and logistics nodes including airfields and heliports.
• Possible use of directional biological weapons.
• Sudden attack on multiple fronts (something like India’s cold war doctrine) with sufficient force to swiftly capture the designated objectives.
• Simultaneous attacks in depth using Special Forces, heliborne forces or swarm drones.
• Opening of the Pakistani front – possibly in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK).
• Continued proxy war on India in conjunction Pakistan but with heightened intensity and possible use of chemical, biological or radiological weaponry with the aim of spreading panic in public and try to force the forward troops to look back.

Future Readiness of Indian Army

The Indian Army (IA) is aware of the dynamic battlefield environment and what additions are coming in the future though we have long distance to cover.

In recognition of the rapid advancement in the emerging military technologies, the IA, with support from the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), has recently established the Quantum Laboratory to spearhead research and training in this field. Research in Quantum Technology will help leapfrog into next generation communication and transform the current system of cryptography in the IA to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC); key thrust areas being Quantum Key Distribution, Quantum Communication, Quantum Computing and Post Quantum Cryptography.

In addition, the IA has also established an AI Centre with over 140 deployments in forward areas with active support of the industry and academia. Training on cyber warfare is being imparted through a state of art cyber range, and cyber security labs. During a seminar on ‘Electromagnetic Spectrum and National Security’ held in October 2021, electromagnetic operations by the IA were discussed, as also the need for the IA to acquire electromagnetic operations capability in conjunction the industry and academia. Since then, an impetus has been given to IA’s Technology Institutions for investing in AI, Quantum and Cyber. No doubt China has a major lead in these spheres but there is no reason that with accelerated focus, the IA will not be able to catch up given the requisite budgetary support.

21st century battlefields require the IA to have both intra-Service and inter-Services networking. Ironically, the IA’s pursuit for acquiring network-centric warfare (NCW) capabilities has been stymied by inadequate support and hurdles by the DRDO on grounds of secrecy; even though the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) under the DRDO acknowledged on record it cannot develop secrecy algorithms and resorts to outsourcing. In addition, certain Operational Information Systems (OIS) were shut down because of budgetary constraints and indecision at the hierarchical level despite spending years and large amount of money in developing them.

The IA needs to be supported in acquiring NCW capabilities at the earliest and the required information systems put in place. Lack of networking creates avoidable gaps in information availability and duplication of tasks. At critical moments of national security, there is no scope for any breaks in downtime. Increase in networking is achieved by investing in networks, and by education and training of soldiers who operate the network and fight another networked force.

Operations in an NCW environment will mean that the engagements will be intense and the speed of weaponry will need almost instantaneous response. This will create a dilemma where in our country, the politicobureaucratic hierarchy wants to control all decision making. This can result in avoidable casualties, loss of opportunities and even failure at tactical level in certain cases. Therefore, as the level of networking increases the IA must decide (and impress upon the national hierarchy) how much decisionmaking should be devolved to subordinates when that decision-making vitally affects military personnel on the battlefield.

The above is also necessary when enemy resorts to jamming our communications. Fortunately at the younger levels, especially battalion commanders, there is enough initiative provided the seniors hold their hands and themselves don’t look back for every decision – though not all are doing so.

In terms of communications, it is good to focus on quantum communications and postquantum cryptology but it is high time the IA’s Tactical Communications System is put in place which has been delayed by more than a decade since it was to be ‘fielded’ in year 2000.

The IA would already be holding exercises to cope with contingencies an environment enemy cyber attacks, jamming of communications and enemy degrading our surveillance capabilities, as also the counter action of quid-pro-quo to the enemy. Exercises under chemical and biological attacks would also be useful.

Adequate focus is already on for acquiring advance weaponry, drones and armed drones, counter-drone systems and the like though under budgetary constraints. Luckily, the Chinese aggression in Eastern Ladakh has kicked us awake. Hopefully, the next defence budget will provide requisite allocations to the IA keeping in mind the looming China threat.

The IA is making changes in the uniforms and combat dress. But more emphasis is required to equip every soldier with better and lighter equipment, exoskeleton gear with integrated communications and integrated batteries, decreasing his overall battle load, increasing his survivability, surveillance capability, firepower and mobility.

The IA has established Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) whose efficacy will be known when tested in battle. However, the organisational mechanics of their establishment is not known; whether they are the same troops that were applied earlier and have been merely grouped together with the same aim, equipment and capabilities? If that be so, it is only an exercise in semantics by naming them IBGs but will unlikely give any added advantage. To that extent, the concept of IBGs may require to be given a relook. We need to see the application of IBGs holistically.

Establishing Credible Deterrence

Both China and Pakistan understand power and nothing else. Deterrence to conflict whether at the sub-conventional level or conventional under the nuclear backdrop not only should be proactive, it must be suitably demonstrated to convey the effectiveness to the enemy. The fact is we have not established the required deterrence till now.

At the sub-conventional level, the war must be carried into the enemy territory, not just an odd surgical strike, Balakot strike or a raid on terrorist camps in Myanmar, which anyway were reaction to suffering casualties and do not classify in the category of pro-active operations. There is need for Army’s Special Forces to be used proactively (not in our territory only) against the enemy. Similarly, the Armed Forces Special Operations Division (AFSOD) remains unemployed though not under the Army.

Faced with the Chinese aggression in Eastern Ladakh during 2020, we have hardly done anything pro-active other than occupying the Kailash Range within our own territory, which too we were forced to vacate by China. Keeping aside the in-house media rhetoric, our image in both China and Pakistan is that of a ‘soft’ state, which in turn reflects on the IA as well.

Chief of Army Staff, General M.M. Naravane is also presently the Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). He could impress upon the political hierarchy the virtues of deterrence, present a pro-active plan and ensure its implementation, bringing home to our adversaries that India means business, will brook no nonsense and cannot be bullied.